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During  the  last  decade  knowledge  about  human  behavior  from  psychology  and sociology
has enhanced  the  ﬁeld  of  economics  of education.  By  now  research  recognizes  cognitive
skills  (as measured  by  achievement  tests)  and  soft  skills  (personality  traits  not  adequately
measured  by achievement  tests)  as  equally  important  drivers  of  later  economic  outcomes,
and skills  are  seen  as  multi-dimensional  rather  than  one-dimensional.  Explicitly  account-
ing for  soft  skills  often  implies  departing  from  the standard  economic  model  by  integrating
concepts  studied  in  behavioral  and  experimental  economics,  such  as self-control,  willing-
ness to compete,  intrinsic  motivation,  and  self-conﬁdence.  We  review  how  approaches  from
behavioral  economics  help  our understanding  of  the  complexity  of educational  investments
and  outcomes,  and  we discuss  what  insights  can be gained  from  such  concepts  in the  context
of education.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
. Introduction
Deciding how much to invest in their education is one of the most important economic decisions people make during the
ourse of their lives. Education improves a range of important individual outcomes such as life-time earnings (Heckman et al.,
006), health, absence of delinquency or good citizenship (Lochner, 2011). Yet, many of the observed education investment
ecisions and outcomes seem puzzling when viewed through the lens of a standard economic model. For example, a sizeable
roportion of students drop out of education just at the point in time where the returns appear to be at their maximum
Oreopoulos, 2007; Heckman et al., 2006), a tendency to shy away from competitive settings makes many girls underperform
n math tests or avoid math courses altogether although the future returns are substantial (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2010;
oensen and Nielsen, 2014), and systems for grading and ranking students have a robust effect on educational achievement
ven if one controls for ability (Jalava et al., 2014; Murphy and Weinhardt, 2014).
In this paper, we review how a range of concepts and questions studied in behavioral and experimental economics
an enhance our understanding of the complexity of educational investments and outcomes and thereby help explain the
uzzling empirical evidence described above.
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Behavioral economics incorporates insights from psychology and sociology into standard economic theory to better
understand human behavior.1 It is often complemented by experimental evidence on actual behavior. Together these two
ﬁelds suggest that people have non-standard preferences (such as preferences for fairness, time-inconsistent preferences and
reference dependent preferences), they have non-standard beliefs (e.g., they are overly self-conﬁdent about their abilities
or they hold self-serving beliefs) and they engage in non-standard decision making by responding to framing of choices or
emotions (cf. DellaVigna, 2009).
As we argue, one needs reference to a range of these concepts to better understand educational outcomes. We  need
reference to self-control problems (time-inconsistent preferences) or self-conﬁdence in order to better understand why
many people invest too little in education. We  need reference to experimental evidence on differences in how people respond
to competitive pressure to better understand why women  are less likely to excel in math or apply for elite education. We
need reference to behavioral theories of motivation to better understand why  relative rank in academic achievement within
a class often inﬂuences academic outcomes independently from ability.
The concepts studied in behavioral and experimental economics are closely related to what is often referred to as “non-
cognitive skills” or “soft skills” in the literature on economics of education.2 Such soft skills encompass personality traits,
goals, motivations, and preferences that are valued in the labor market, in school, and in many other domains (Heckman and
Kautz, 2012). While the ﬁeld of economics of education by now recognizes that cognitive skills (as measured by test scores)
and soft skills have similar importance for educational achievements, soft skills are often treated as a black box summarized
by a parameter in the utility or production function. As we outline in this review, applying models from behavioral economics
and insights from laboratory and ﬁeld experiments help us to better understand what is going on inside this black box, which
in turn helps us to better understand investments into education.
The review provides a selected coverage of topics from behavioral and experimental economics. Compared to other
review articles in behavioral economics, we do not structure this review along the most prominent “behavioral biases” such
as reference dependent preferences, social preferences, time-inconsistent preferences, or non-standard beliefs. Rather we
focus on those concepts from behavioral and experimental economics that seem particularly relevant for understanding
investments into education. For example, there are several experimental studies that examine the development of social
preferences in children.3 Yet, (at least up to now) the impact of social preferences on educational investments outcomes has
not been examined and thus we do not review this literature further here. Further, we focus on theoretical and experimental
studies in combination with empirical evidence. In a complementary review, Lavecchia et al. (2014) survey intervention
studies that are inspired by behavioral economics.
Combining the two lines of thinking embodied in the literatures on economics of education and behavioral economics
offers many insights, as we argue. Yet there are some caveats: First, there is a caveat regarding the use of experiments to gain
insights into the economics of education. While much of the empirical research in the educational literature is conducted
using large panel data sets and well-deﬁned population models, most lab and ﬁeld experiments use convenience samples,
low stakes and rely on the experimental random assignment method. In addition, the tasks in the lab are sometimes artiﬁcial
compared to real world decision making. Although there is some replication of the main results with more representative
samples, high stakes, and in ﬁeld settings (see Falk and Heckman, 2009, for a discussion), additional research is needed.
Further, the results from experimental economics mostly shed light on short run effects (e.g., how extrinsic incentives affect
motivation) because long run effects cannot easily be observed in the laboratory or even ﬁeld experiments. Second, there is a
caveat about using behavioral economics, which relies on the same techniques and models as standard economic theory. Its
aim is to enrich standard economic theory with more realistic assumptions about human behavior – based on insights from
psychology or sociology. Thereby, it comes with its own set assumptions. And these assumptions also have to be validated
empirically. As a consequence, many models in this ﬁeld still are evolving (e.g., see the discussion of how models of reference
dependent preferences progressed in Barberis, 2013). Thus, while we think that insights from behavioral and experimental
economics can enhance our understanding of educational decision making, care should be taken when interpreting and
applying the results.
The remainder of the paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes how economics of education often models
student achievement as outcomes of an education production function (Hanushek, 1979; Todd and Wolpin, 2003) that
depends on individual skills and abilities, as well as the history of family inputs, school and pre-school inputs, and in some
cases also peer inputs. We  then review evidence on the importance of soft skills for educational achievement and we outline
how researchers have applied soft skills in the ﬁeld of economics of education. Noting that many of the factors of interest are
closely related to the concepts studied in behavioral and experimental economics, we review in Section 3 relevant articles
from these ﬁelds. Section 4 links back to the education production function by describing how concepts from behavioral and
1 For an overview of the ﬁeld of behavioral economics see Rabin (1998) and DellaVigna (2009).
2 They are also sometimes described as socio-emotional skills or meta-cognitive skills.
3 Children become fairer, and less spiteful as they become older (Fehr et al., 2008, 2013; Almås et al., 2010). Sutter et al. (2010) distinguish different
social  preferences and observe that inequality aversion becomes less prevalent with age, while efﬁciency concerns become more important for boys and
maximin preferences more important for girls. Parochialism ﬁrst becomes signiﬁcant in the teenage years (Fehr et al., 2013). Further, trust increases from
early  childhood to early adulthood (Sutter and Kocher, 2007). Belot and van de Ven (2011) show the importance of friendship ties by establishing that
children are biased in favor of their friends.
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xperimental economics relate to the three components in education production. Section 5 discusses policy implications
nd lessons for future research.
. Soft skills in economics of education
.1. Background: education production
Coleman (1966) was one of the ﬁrst to study the relationship between the inputs into the educational process and
tudent performance. Since then much research has been devoted to the statistical analysis of this relationship, which led
o a formalization of the education production function by Hanushek (1979) and Todd and Wolpin (2003). This approach
elates outcomes of the education production process – student achievement (A) as measured e.g., on standardized tests or
ttained education – to the student’s individual skills and abilities (), as well as to family (F), school (S), and peer inputs
P). Let time period 0 be the period prior to school entry and let time periods 1 and 2 be the ﬁrst and second years of school.
hen the achievement production may  be described as follows:
A1 = g0(F0, ); A2 = g1(S1, P1, F1, F0, ) (1)
he components F and S are thought of as investment responses deﬁned by a family decision rule and a school decision rule,
espectively. For instance family input in time period 0, F0, is a function of family resources, W,  and student ability, , while
1 would also depend upon student achievement at school entry, A1. In comparison to the model presented by Todd and
olpin (2003), we have detached peer inputs, P, from the other inputs, although it is clearly decided upon by the family
nd/or the school and would often be considered a part of the family or school input in this model.4
The component related to a student’s individual skills and abilities () is often thought of as stemming from an initial
ndowment or learning capacity. Empirical studies typically assume that unobserved ability is a single, time invariant factor
hat can be differenced out in a panel, or they employ proxies such as parental cognitive ability.
The family inputs component of education production (F) is a function of the family’s permanent economic and mental
esources (W). It includes time and money investments by the family as well as child development activities from the
ime of conception onwards. Already Coleman (1966) noted that families play a strong role in shaping adult outcomes.
eckman (2008) states that “the accident of birth is a major source of inequality” and he reports descriptive evidence which
uggests that growing up in an intact family with an educated mother is a strong predictor of positive adult outcomes.
nvestigating the causal impact of parental education on childrens’ education Holmlund et al. (2011) ﬁnd that almost half
f the intergenerational correlation is causal. However, it remains an open question to what extent this effect is caused by
igher income or by other inﬂuences related to parental education such as parenting style, patience or role model effects.
he literature thus far suggests that one should judge the quality of the family environment not only on the amount of
esources available but more broadly based on the quality of parenting, which may  also encompass transmission of self-
ontrol, self-regulation, self-conﬁdence, risk attitudes, patience, trust, altruism, or motivation (an issue to which we  return
n Section 4.1).
The school inputs component of education production (S) captures school and pre-school resources. Various studies con-
ider the impact of school resources – the most studied and arguably the most important of which are class size and teacher
uality – on educational achievement. According to Hanushek (2006) research provides little indication of a consistent
elationship between resources available to schools (reﬂected among other things in class size) and student achievement.
thers disagree, however. Krueger (2003) and Heinesen (2010) ﬁnd substantial class size effects on educational achievement.
ecently Fredriksson et al. (2013) documented persistent long-run effects of reduced class size in Sweden. Interestingly, these
ere driven by impacts on “non-cognitive skills”. When it comes to teacher quality, there is a wide consensus that teachers
re an important part of the school environment. Students seem to beneﬁt from good teachers and to suffer from bad tea-
hers. Jackson (2013) shows that some teachers are effective at improving students’ cognitive skills while others are effective
t improving their “non-cognitive skills”, and that both types of skills are equally important for important adult outcomes
income, college attendance, and whether a student is arrested). However, it is largely unknown what constitutes a good
eacher, since formal qualiﬁcations, certiﬁcates and experience of teachers do not have much explanatory power (Hanushek
nd Rivkin, 2006). Overall, both when it comes to the importance of class size and importance of teachers, research sug-
ests that their effects on soft skills of students have to be accounted for in order to understand the impact on educational
chievement.
The peer effects component of education production (P) is a function of the quality of a student’s peer group. Hanushek
2006) and Sacerdote (2011), for example, argue that peer groups are as important for student outcomes as other inputs
n the production function, although the validity of these results is sometimes questioned (Angrist, 2014). While linear-in-
eans models only ﬁnd moderate effects of having high ability peers in the class, nonlinear models often reveal substantialffects (e.g., Lavy et al., 2012). Peer effects on behavioral outcomes – such as drinking, crime, drug use or teen pregnancy
 are larger than those on academic outcomes – such as test scores (see Sacerdote, 2011), and recent studies suggest that
isruptive peers are detrimental to both student behavior and academic achievement (Eriksen et al., 2014; Figlio, 2007).
4 Recently, it has been shown that it may  be difﬁcult to manipulate peer groups to actually improve outcomes (Carrell et al., 2013).
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To summarize, for all the components in the education production function, family inputs, school inputs and peer inputs,
it is evident that research in economics of education increasingly refers to soft skills in order to make sense of observed
behavior, and we now elaborate in more detail on such attempts.
2.2. Soft skills in economics of education
There are various channels through which education inﬂuences individual outcomes such as life-time earnings, but
until recently the literature has focused mainly on the cognitive skill channel. For example, a higher level of education might
improve earnings because it impacts cognitive skills directly (Cunha and Heckman, 2007), because it signals higher cognitive
skills (Spence, 1973), or because it plays a direct role in revealing cognitive skills to the labor market through the vitae which
typically includes information about grades, major and college attended (Arcidiacono et al., 2010).
In the last decade, however, researchers increasingly recognized the importance of soft skills for educational achievement
and investments. For example, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) discuss lacking motivation and Oreopoulos (2007) discusses
self-control problems as reasons for high-school dropout. In the same vein, Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) report that
a test certifying that the test taker has American or Canadian high-school-level academic skills (the General Educational
Development Test) is a mixed signal. On the one hand, it signals that the individual possesses the cognitive skills to fulﬁll high
school. But on the other hand, it signals that the individual lacks the soft skills needed to complete an ordinary high-school
education for which the person would have earned an ordinary high-school diploma.5
A body of research provides speciﬁc evidence on the impact that soft skills have on educational achievement. A number
of papers highlight the role of patience and self-control. Shoda et al. (1990) ﬁnd that the ability to delay gratiﬁcation at the
age of 4 relates to academic competence in adolescents, and Duckworth and Seligman (2005) observe that self-discipline is
a better predictor than IQ of academic performance6 in adolescents. In a recent study, Lindahl et al. (2014) ﬁnd a negative
correlation between impatience and school performance (such as grades and the highest completed school level). Similarly,
the predictive power of personality traits (such as the Big Five) for educational achievement is comparable to the one of IQ
and achievement tests (Almlund et al., 2011). Personality traits even inﬂuence the level of education for individuals with a
very high IQ as Gensowski (2013) shows.
Not only do soft skills inﬂuence educational achievement, but education and the educational environment also affect
soft skills. Next to the family and peers, pre-school and school play an important role in shaping soft skills (see, e.g., Cunha
et al., 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Datta Gupta and Simonsen, 2010). For example, the Perry Preschool Program, an
intervention aimed at socially disadvantaged children, did not have a lasting effect on IQ. Nevertheless, the treatment group
outperformed the control group on a range of individual outcome measures later in life – suggesting that the program
affected soft skills that were relevant for life-time success (for the effects of the Perry Preschool Program, see e.g., Heckman
et al., 2010).
To summarize, there is a large body of evidence suggesting that soft skills play an equally important role for education
investments and outcomes as cognitive skills do. Education research in economics7 has started to incorporate a broader
set of skills by allowing for multidimensional endowments and skills in modeling the inputs to and outputs of education
production and by parameterization of preferences (e.g., Almlund et al., 2011).8 Yet these approaches most often treat soft
skills as a black box. As we argue in the next section, behavioral and experimental economics can contribute to reﬁne our
understanding of what soft skills are and how they inﬂuence education investments and outcomes.
3. Soft skills and investments seen from the perspective of behavioral economics
Several of the soft skills are related to a range of concepts and questions studied in behavioral and experimental eco-
nomics, such as willingness to compete, self-control problems (time-inconsistent preferences), intrinsic motivation, or
self-conﬁdence. In the following, we discuss the insights that behavioral and experimental economics provide on soft skills
and how these inﬂuence investments into education. Thereby, we make an attempt to further open the black box of soft
skills in education investments.3.1. Competition and gender differences
The picture that emerges from the large literature on gender differences in academic performance is that girls tend to
get better grades and boys tend to do better on standardized tests (Duckworth and Seligman, 2006). In particular, more
5 Bowles et al. (2001) demonstrate the importance of soft skills for employment decisions. They emphasize the results of a survey where employers were
asked to rate the importance of a range of characteristics of applicants for non-supervisory or production jobs for their hiring decisions. “Attitudes” ranked
much  higher than “years of schooling”, “score on tests given by the employer” or “academic performance”.
6 Measures of educational performance include ﬁnal grades, school attendance, standardized achievement-test scores, and selection into a competitive
high-school program.
7 For a meta-analysis of studies in psychology that examine the factors that inﬂuence educational achievement see Hattie (2008).
8 Thus A from Eq. (1) increasingly includes soft skills.
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oys than girls obtain high test scores in mathematics (e.g., Pope and Sydnor, 2010).9 Next to mechanisms that cause gaps in
elf-discipline and grading biases, gaps in individual responses to competitive pressure can possibly explain this observation.
e start by outlining the experimental evidence on a gender gap in competitiveness, before we discuss the consequences
f this gender gap for educational choices and performance.
Evidence. Gneezy et al. (2003) were the ﬁrst to provide experimental evidence on the gender gap in responses to compet-
tive pressure. They observe a gender gap in performance in a tournament, but not in a non-competitive situation. Not only
oes the performance of men  and women differ in competitive situations, men  and women  also differ in their selection into
ompetitive situations. Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Datta Gupta et al. (2013) examine this selection. They observe
hat women “shy away from competition”. In contrast to Gneezy et al. (2003), Datta Gupta et al. (2013) however do not
bserve a clear gender gap in performance.
What drives this gender gap in competitiveness? When does it arise and when not? A range of studies suggest that gender
tereotypes, the group composition and cultural differences matter for how individuals respond to competition.10 Regarding
ender stereotypes, Dreber et al. (2014), for instance, ﬁnd that adolescent boys and girls are equally likely to self-select into
ompetition for a verbal task but that a gender gap exists for a mathematical task. In the same vein, Pope and Sydnor (2010)
nd large variation across U.S. states in gender disparities in math and science tests, where boys stereotypically do better,
nd in tests of reading, where girls stereotypically do better. Interestingly, some states appear to be more gender-equal
cross all subjects, whereas gender disparities in other states conform more to the gender stereotypes. State differences in
ender attitudes measured by a question11 from the General Social Survey (GSS) explain to which extent test scores conform
o gender stereotypes, with states with stronger gender attitudes also having larger gender gaps in test scores. Observing
hat the genetic and hormonal differences across genders should not depend on the state one is born in, the authors argue
hat their results point to differences across states in the social forces that reinforce stereotypes.
Next to the gender stereotypes, group composition matters. For example, girls from single sex schools are more eager to
ngage in competition than girls from co-educational schools (Booth and Nolen, 2012). Further, the gender gap in willingness
o compete arises in some cultures, but not in others. Andersen et al. (2010) probe such cultural differences and ﬁnd that in
he patriarchal Indian villages there is no gender gap in the selection into competition at the age of 7, but a gap exists at the
ge of 15, while in the matrilineal villages no gender gap emerges at all. In contrast, Cárdenas et al. (2012) ﬁnd a gender gap
egarding the selection into competition in Sweden but not in Colombia – even though Sweden is usually viewed as more
ender equal than Colombia.
Consequences. Some of the results discussed above indicate that females and males perform differently under competitive
ressure. To the extent that educational activities and education programs are viewed as competitive, gender differences in
ompetitiveness hence may  be an important factor behind gender differences in educational choices. Niederle and Vesterlund
2010), for instance, argue that an individual’s response to competitive pressure is a soft skill that inﬂuences test scores over
nd above inﬂuences of ability. They argue that gender differences in this soft skill in part explain why more boys than
irls excel in math. Math may  be seen as a competitive discipline because answers are either right or wrong and because
ath is highly predictive of future earnings. Further, math teaching and test-taking most often take place in a mixed-sex
nvironment against the backdrop of the stereotype that boys excel in math but girls excel in language and reading. In line
ith the stereotype, girls at the top of the ability distribution tend to underestimate their own  relative math skills. In such a
ontext, a substantial fraction of girls may  avoid competition against males. Altogether, there hence is a risk that test scores
agnify or distort gender differences in skills and especially so for math skills.
There is ample evidence suggesting that the abovementioned mechanisms play a role in generating gender gaps in
ducational choices and academic performance.
The impact of single-sex education on academic performance is investigated by Eisenkopf et al. (2014). During the period
001–2008, a group of 808 female students entering a Swiss high school were randomly assigned to a four year single-sex or
o-educational high school program. The authors document that females taught in single-sex classrooms outperform those
ttending co-educational program by 7–10% in math while there was no performance difference in German. The effect is
argest for females with high ex-ante math abilities. Based on a supplementary survey, the authors ﬁnd that a plausible
echanism for the ﬁnding is improvement of self-assessed math ability and academic self-concept in math.
The relative performance of men  and women in highly competitive exams is investigated in three studies using data from
ntrance exams for university programs (Ors et al., 2013; Jurajda and Münich, 2011; Pekkarinen, 2014). They all observe a
ender gap. Ors et al. (2013) uses data from the entrance examinations for the MSc  at a French elite university (HEC, Paris).
hey contrast performance on the entrance examinations with how the same cohort does in less competitive situations,
sing data from ﬁnal high-school examinations and ﬁrst-year exams at HEC. Comparing students with the same educational
9 Speciﬁcally, the pattern appears to be one of rough gender equality in average test scores, but differences at the extremes. For example, in a meta-
nalysis of 100 studies Hyde et al. (1990) ﬁnd only a small and insigniﬁcant average standardized difference in math test scores between boys and girls.
ut  the math test scores of boys consistently have larger variance (e.g., Hedges and Nowell, 1995).
10 An additional line of inquiry is to scrutinize how early the gender gap emerges. However, here the results are still not conclusive. Dreber et al. (2011)
nd no gender difference in the performance in reaction to competition for school children aged 7–10 for tasks such as running, skipping rope and dancing,
hile Sutter and Rützler (2010) ﬁnd a gender gap in the willingness to compete already at the age of 3 for the task of running among Austrian children.
11 “Is it much better for everyone involved if the man  is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family?”
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background they ﬁnd that men  outperform women on the competitive entrance examinations, even though women do better
on the non-competitive high-school examinations and in the ﬁrst year non-mathematical courses. As a consequence, men are
more likely to enter the competitive programs even though they have inferior ex-ante abilities compared to women. Jurajda
and Münich (2011) observe a cohort applying to Czech universities. Similar to Ors et al. (2013) they observe a gender gap in
performance for the university entry examinations to the very competitive programs, although women do equally well in
the entrance examinations for the less competitive programs. Pekkarinen (2014) studies gender differences in performance
at university entry examinations for Business and Economics programs in Finland. When he controls for the fact that female
applicants have higher ex-ante ability and that they apply to lower quality universities than males, he ﬁnds that females are
less likely to gain entry than males. Further, he shows that females deviate more from an optimal answering strategy than
males by answering too few items on the test.12
Two other studies examine the consequences of differences in the willingness to compete (elicited with experimental
tasks) for the choice of high school and college major. Buser et al. (2014) observe that both gender and the willingness
to compete relate to the choice of the high-school proﬁle among Dutch school children. Women  enroll in less prestigious
proﬁles than men  and competitiveness accounts for 18 percent of the gender gap (controlling for grades and mathematical
ability). In contrast, Reuben et al. (2013) do not observe any relation between willingness to compete and the choice of college
major among a sample of undergraduate students at NYU. Expected future earnings however do relate to competitiveness,
as well as a measure of overconﬁdence. The different results of these two studies could possibly be explained by the different
subject pools. While Buser et al. (2014) consider Dutch secondary school students on a pre-university track, Reuben et al.
(2013) consider students who are already admitted to a private elite university and who hence are part of a selected sample
with some tolerance for being in a competitive environment.
To sum up, there is evidence that some females shy away from competitive settings – in particular in environments where
males most often dominate or excel. In an education context, this may  explain why  women tend to avoid elite education
and educational paths that are heavy on math. These behavioral patterns may  also explain some of the gender differences
in education and labor market outcomes.
3.2. Self-control
Decisions about investments into one’s education involve trading off costs right now (such as boredom and fatigue from
studying, or foregone current earnings) against beneﬁts that are often far into the future (such as higher future earnings). From
behavioral economics we know people facing such intertemporal trade-offs often exhibit time-inconsistent preferences. They
are more patient when thinking about decisions in the distant future than when they actually have to make such decisions
right now. This phenomenon is often modeled by assuming a present bias, i.e., an additional discount factor applied to any
payoff that lies in the future (Laibson, 1997).13
As a consequence of the present-bias, people face the problem of wanting one thing but later doing another thing unless
they can exert self-control. In the context of education, for example, a non-negligible fraction of students provide insufﬁcient
study effort or procrastinate on important tasks like exam preparation even though they later regret it (see, e.g., Solomon
and Rothblum, 1984; Steel, 2007). As a consequence grades, for instance, do not just depend on intellectual aptitude but
also on being able to sustain effort and concentration over extended periods of time in spite of fatigue, boredom or other
distractions.
Not only are there individual differences in such a present bias, but also there is heterogeneity in awareness of having
such a bias. For example, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) distinguish between naïve individuals who  erroneously think they
have time-consistent preferences and sophisticated individuals who are aware of their present bias. (Types in between, who
underestimate the extent of their present bias, are referred to as partially naïve.) This distinction has important consequences
for behavior. For example, sophisticates make use of commitment devices to regulate their behavior to avoid the impulsive
choices that naïves will make. And this distinction is also important for informing policy, because low study effort can result
either because students are naïve about their present-bias, which for example could be addressed through better feedback
by teachers, or because of a lack of possibilities for committing to study effort, which for example could be addressed by
offering supervised homework sessions after school.In the following, we ﬁrst brieﬂy discuss experiments that elicit time-(inconsistent)-preferences in settings relevant for
education and then review how time-(inconsistent)-preferences are related to educational decisions and achievement, such
as drop-out, grades and disciplinary referrals. Notice, however, that the concepts are not always deﬁned as rigorously in
some of the experiments as in the theoretical models described above.14
12 Related to these studies, Zhang (2013) examines how experimentally elicited measures of willingness to compete relate to taking a competitive entrance
exam  in China. She ﬁnds that more competitive adolescents are more likely to take the exam, but does not ﬁnd any gender differences.
13 Here the overall utility at date t, Ut , is given by: Ut = ut + ˇ
∑T
s=t+1ı
s−tus , where ut refers to the per-period utility. While ı captures the standard
exponential discount factor,  ˇ captures the individual’s present bias. The present bias implies that the discounting between the present and the future is
higher  than between any future time periods.
14 Some experiments do not aim at eliciting time-preferences, but rather confront subjects with some tempting task or use survey measures such as the
(brief)  self control scale by Tangney et al. (2004). Other experiments only elicit a broad measure of patience (“ˇı”) and do not test for time-inconsistent
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Evidence. The famous delay-of-gratiﬁcation study by Mischel et al. (1972) documented that many children are not able to
esist the temptation of a sweet for a few minutes, despite large returns to waiting. Such patterns of substantial impatience
nd heterogeneity in levels of patience emerge also from a range of lab or ﬁeld experiments that elicit time-preferences
n educational settings using behavioral measures or survey measures of patience and/or self-control (e.g., Ariely and
ertenbroch, 2002; Bettinger and Slonim, 2007; Wong, 2008; Castillo et al., 2011; Sutter et al., 2013; Lindahl et al., 2014;
isin and Hyndman, 2014). There is also some evidence that boys are more impatient and exert less self-discipline than girls
Duckworth and Seligman, 2006).
Consequences. Patience is a predictor of academic success. Shoda et al. (1990) ﬁnd that the ability to delay gratiﬁcation at
he age of 4 correlates with higher scores on the U.S. Standardized Aptitude Test (SAT). A number of other studies examine the
elationship between grades and time-preferences. A recent example is Lindahl et al. (2014), who  ﬁnd a negative correlation
etween impatience and school performance (such as grades and the highest completed school level). Novarese and Di
iovinazzo (2013) observe that educational achievement can be predicted based on how prompt a student is at enrolling
t university. They argue that one can interpret later enrollment as a measure of procrastination. Duckworth and Seligman
2006) argue that gender differences in patience and self-control, with boys being more impatient, may  explain why girls
end to get better grades than boys despite similar performance on aptitude tests. By design aptitude tests should not be very
ensitive to preparation, whereas school grades to a large extent reﬂect behaviors associated with patience, such as putting
n consistent effort throughout a school term, timely home-work and exam preparation and the ability to resist distractions.
Time-preferences can also help explain major educational decisions, such as dropping-out as Oreopoulos (2007) argues.
e investigates the effect of compulsory schooling laws in the US, Canada and the UK on school attainments, earnings,
ealth, employment, poverty and happiness. The optimality of dropout decisions is evaluated from the perspective that the
eneﬁts from dropping out must equalize the costs from doing so. Oreopoulos (2007) ﬁnds that school attainment, health,
mployment and happiness are positively affected by laws imposing another year of compulsory schooling on “would-be-
ropouts”. Further, he ﬁnds that lifetime wealth increases by 15% with another year of compulsory schooling. These large
eturns to education imply that the ﬁnancial costs from dropping out are generally higher than the beneﬁts. Oreopoulos
2007) discusses that it is unlikely that “high-school aversion” is able to explain drop out decisions and he suggests that a
ajor explanation of drop-out decisions are self-control problems faced by adolescents. In conjunction with the arguments
f Duckworth and Seligman (2006), gender differences in patience and self-control could thus help explain why over the
ast few decades women have had higher average years of schooling than men  (for the US see, e.g., Charles and Luoh, 2003)
nd why more women attend college than men  (e.g., Goldin et al., 2006).
Patience also affects conduct at school. Castillo et al. (2011) investigate how time preferences relate to race and disciplinary
eferrals. The latter variables have previously been shown to predict outcomes such as dropping out of school and life income.
hey ﬁnd that black children are more impatient than white children. Further, black children get more disciplinary referrals
han white children on average and boys get more disciplinary referrals than girls on average. Their estimations reveal a
ositive relation between the discount rate and the number of disciplinary referrals, even when controlling for gender and
ace. Sutter et al. (2013) elicit time-preferences, as well as risk and ambiguity attitudes from 661 children aged 10–18 years.
igher ability students (measured by their math grade), and more risk-averse children are more patient. The authors relate
hese preferences to discipline at school, savings, as well as health-related risk-behavior and outcomes (smoking, drinking
lcohol, body mass index). All of these are predominantly associated with impatience and not with risk preferences: More
mpatient children have worse disciplinary conduct at schools, lower savings, and worse health outcomes.
Self-control problems affect adult students as well, although they to some extent may  be more aware of the challenges
nd may  be better able to compensate. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) conduct a ﬁeld experiment within an executive-
ducation course at MIT  with 99 participants. Within this course participants have to write three papers. Participants are
ssigned to one of two treatments. In the ﬁrst, participants are given ﬁxed, evenly spread deadlines. In the second condition,
articipants could choose their deadlines freely (but once a deadline is set it is binding). Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002)
bserve that participants do impose deadlines on themselves15 and that deadlines help to improve task performance. How-
ver, performance is worse compared with the treatment where students are given evenly spread deadlines, suggesting
hat students do not optimally set deadlines. These results indicate that students have self-control problems, but only have
imited awareness of the extent of their self-control problems.16 In contrast, Burger et al. (2011) do not ﬁnd a positive effect
f exogenously given, evenly spread deadlines on the completion rates of an academic task (studying a certain number of
ours in exchange for a ﬁxed payment). The latter results indicate that the reduced ﬂexibility that a deadline brings along
ight counterbalance the positive effect it has on overcoming motivation problems. Bisin and Hyndman (2014) report a
imilar ﬁnding: self-set deadlines do not improve task completion rates, even though students show a demand for such
references and self-control problems (“  ˇ < 1”), while others elicit both preference parameters separately. Thus, some experimental work cannot distinguish
hether impatient behavior is due to low ı and  ˇ = 1 (time-consistent preferences) or due to moderate ı and  ˇ < 1 (time-inconsistent preferences).
15 Note that this is contrary to what the standard economic model would predict. A rational agent with time-consistent preferences would not without
ny  compensation give up ﬂexibility, because it may  be needed, e.g., if illness causes an unforeseen delay.
16 Wong (2008) also investigates how aware students are of possible self-control problems. Wong (2008) ﬁnds that most students suffer from time-
nconsistency and divides them into three sub-groups: the naïves (who do not anticipate their delay in preparing for the exam), partial naïves (who
nticipate some delay, but not as big a delay as the actual delay), and sophisticates (who fully anticipate their delay). Most students are classiﬁed as partially
aïve.  Further, his results indicate that both predicted and unpredicted delays are negatively associated with students’ performance at the mid-term exam.
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commitment devices. They discuss that next to present-bias other factors, such as students’ overconﬁdence and lacking per-
severance, are at play. Thus, overall, the effectiveness of (exogenously set) commitment devices in the educational context is
mixed. While there seems to be a clear demand for such devices, they do not always improve performance. Further research
is needed to better understand when such commitment devices are effective in an educational context and when not.
Often there is no need to impose external commitment devices, because internal commitment devices like goals, self-
rewards, or mental accounts can help to overcome self-control problems. A large literature in psychology examines how and
when exogenously set goals affect task performance (for a review see Locke and Latham, 1990). Recently, theoretical studies
in behavioral economics have taken up these ideas to study how people endogenously set their goals and how such self-
set goals help to overcome self-control problems (Koch and Nafziger, 2011; Hsiaw, 2013). The key idea is that goals induce
reference standards. Loss aversion then makes substandard performance psychological painful and thereby motivates people
to stick to their goals. Yet, for severe self-control problems people might rather give up. Koch and Nafziger (2014) extend
these ideas to ask how people evaluate their goals when facing multiple tasks: in narrow mental accounts (e.g., by setting a
daily study goal), or in broad mental accounts (e.g., a weekly study goal). They show that when facing routine tasks or when
facing repeatedly the same task (such as studying on two subsequent days), students should set narrow (daily) goals, while
for tasks where the outcomes are more uncertain people should adopt broad goals. Koch et al. (2014) study how self-rewards
complement goal setting.
To summarize, there is ample evidence linking impatience and self-control problems to educational decisions (such as
drop-out) and low educational achievement (such as worse grades and disciplinary referrals). But at least for some adult
students, there seems to be some awareness of self-control problems that translates into a demand for external commitment
devices such as deadlines for course work that can help to overcome the self-control problem, or the use of self-regulatory
strategies such as goal setting that offer internal commitment. Understanding commitment is a major theme in behavioral
economics (for a recent survey see Bryan et al., 2010). Understanding better the effectiveness of commitment devices in an
educational context can provide further insights into how to improve educational outcomes by targeting self-control issues.
3.3. Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
So far we have pointed out that self-control problems or reluctance to compete can lead to underinvestment in education
and low educational achievement. We  now turn to one possible solution to such underinvestment problems – namely the
provision of incentives for educational attainment. We  start reviewing evidence from lab and ﬁeld experiments on the
effectiveness of extrinsic rewards for educational achievement. There is a large literature in economics that considers the
design of extrinsic rewards in an educational context. As our focus is on behavioral economics, we only brieﬂy review this
literature here and focus more on studies that discuss the effects and design of rewards from a behavioral angle. Then we
discuss possible pitfalls of providing extrinsic incentives.
Extrinsic motivation. In the school context, extrinsic incentives can stem either from monetary or non-monetary rewards,
or from grades and ranking. We  ﬁrst discuss the effects of rewards before we  turn to the effects of grades and relative rank
within a class on educational performance. Gneezy et al. (2011) survey ﬁeld experiments that examine the role of extrinsic
incentives in schools. Firstly, they conclude from the surveyed articles that incentives work well in increasing attendance and
enrollment (e.g., Angrist et al., 2006; Behrman et al., 2005). Secondly, they summarize that incentives have mixed results on
effort and achievement (e.g., Bettinger, 2012; Fryer, 2011; Rodriguez-Planas, 2014; Levitt et al., 2012). Thirdly, they conclude
that incentives seem to work for some students but not for others and that gender and ability play a role here (e.g., Angrist
and Lavy, 2009; Leuven et al., 2010).17
Levitt et al. (2012) conduct a ﬁeld experiment which introduces rewards for performance on a low-stakes standardized
test. A reward is triggered when a student improves compared to the previous test. Building on ideas from behavioral
economics, they investigate whether different framings and timings of rewards have an impact on test scores. Further,
they investigate whether there is a difference between the effect of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial incentives. They ﬁnd that
immediate high ﬁnancial incentives ($20) and non-ﬁnancial rewards (a trophy) improve performance, while low ﬁnancial
rewards ($10) do not. However, if the former type of rewards is delivered with a delay, they also do not have any impact. Levitt
et al. (2012) also ﬁnd that, contrary to their initial hypothesis, it does not matter whether the reward is framed as a gain (you
get $10) or a loss (you start with $10 that you need to repay if performance is substandard). Elementary school students turn
out to be more responsive to incentives than secondary students, who are especially responsive to non-ﬁnancial incentives.
Though not explicitly a reward, a desire to obtain good grades or high test scores is what motivates many students. One
reason, of course, is that grades and test scores have a direct impact on later education and labor market opportunities. But
grades also affect students’ status – and status is a powerful motivator of human behavior (Frank, 1985). Status is obtained
from achieving a high rank on some dimension that is considered important by one’s peers or society as a whole. Dubey
and Geanakoplos (2010) investigate in a theoretical model how grading systems motivate students who are sensitive to
status ranking. They ﬁnd that absolute grading (grades depend on passing a performance target) always motivates students
better to provide effort than relative grading (rank-based or grading on a curve) if students are disparate in their abilities.
17 Leuven et al. (2010) ﬁnd that incentives had a positive effect on able students, but a negative impact on the less able students, and Angrist and Lavy
(2009)  ﬁnd that incentives had an impact on girls, but not on boys.
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he optimal grading system is not ﬁne grained (such as providing percentage scores 100, 99, . . .)  but turns out to contain
ome coarseness and a pyramidal structure. Speciﬁcally, grades should lump together larger bands of performance, and the
est grade should occur less frequently than the second best grade and so on. Even if students are homogeneous in their
bilities, absolute grading still motivates students better to provide effort than relative grading if a weak assumption about
he density of the exam scores is satisﬁed. In this case, either ﬁne or coarse grading can be optimal, depending on the detailed
hape of the distribution of the exam scores.
Two papers build on the theoretical work by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010) on grading schemes. Jalava et al. (2014)
onduct a ﬁeld experiment in Swedish primary schools to examine the effects of different grading schemes (such as rank
ased, or absolute grading) and of a non-monetary prize on students’ test scores. They ﬁnd that all these extrinsic rewards,
xcept for absolute grading increase performance relative to the control group which did not receive any incentives. These
esults are in contrast to some of the theoretical predictions of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010) – indicating that the incentive
ffects of grades might not only stem from status concerns. Using administrative data on the entire student population in
ngland, Murphy and Weinhardt (2014) investigate the importance of a student’s rank. Consistent with the theoretical
ssumption of Dubey and Geanakoplos (2010), they show that rank matters. Speciﬁcally, having a high rank in one’s class at
ge 11 in primary school, has a large and robust effect on secondary school achievement at age 14, even after controlling for
rior test scores and school and pupil effects. Speciﬁcally, their study exploits the fact that pupils with similar performance
n a national test often have quite different relative rankings within their respective classes. As grades depend on both ability
nd effort, a high rank can inﬂuence subsequent performance by providing feedback to the student about her ability or by
ffecting the students’ motivation to provide effort. The authors argue that the positive effect of being highly ranked is not
riven by learning about ability but rather by pupils developing a more positive self-concept, which in turn inﬂuences their
ost of effort for subsequent educational investments. We turn to such sources of intrinsic motivation next.
Self-conﬁdence as a source of intrinsic motivation. Much of the analysis of educational investments focuses on extrinsic
eneﬁts from higher achievement, neglecting intrinsic motivation such as curiosity and a joy of learning. Self-conﬁdence and
elf-esteem play a key role in building up such intrinsic motivation. Benabou and Tirole (2002) provide the ﬁrst formal theo-
etical model in economics investigating the maintenance and enhancement of self-conﬁdence. They suggest that an overly
ositive view of one’s ability may  be an important motivational factor, because ability and effort are complementary factors
n (educational) production. Speciﬁcally, they show that it is optimal for individuals with self-control problems to selectively
rocess information about their ability as a way to build up self-conﬁdence.18 Greater self-conﬁdence makes students believe
hat their effort will be very productive, which in turn enhances their motivation to study. This positive motivation effect
an compensate for negative motivation effects stemming, e.g., from self-control problems. An implication of this ﬁnding is
hat educators or parents may  strategically give distorted feedback in order to boost students’ self-conﬁdence.
Wang and Yang (2003) and Filippin and Paccagnella (2012) further apply these ideas. Wang and Yang (2003) theoretically
nvestigate the notion of self-conﬁdence in an economic model of education where students care both about their grades
nd about their own perception of their ability. The grading system determines how much information a grade conveys
bout ability and thereby inﬂuences self-conﬁdence, which in turn affects the choice of effort through the complementarity
escribed above. If students care primarily about their perceived ability then strong competition induced by relative grading
ay  actually lead to low effort, even from high ability students. Competition limits the number of good grades, making it
ess likely that a student gets favorable feedback about her ability if she works hard. To protect a prior positive self-image
 student can put in low effort, which makes the grades relatively uninformative about ability and allows the student to
aintain her self-image no matter what happens.
Filippin and Paccagnella (2012) explore in a theoretical model how a small initial difference in self-conﬁdence can result in
iverging patterns of human capital accumulation, even when students start off with the same level of initial ability. Among
ther things, their model can explain how “social heritage” can arise through self-conﬁdence, consistent with empirical
tudies that show self-conﬁdence to correlate with socio-economic background (see, e.g., Chowdry et al., 2011; Gregg and
ashbrook, 2011; Chevalier et al., 2009). The theoretical results thus highlight how important early and accurate feedback
n cognitive skills may  be for disadvantaged children in particular.
Interaction of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. One may  be tempted to see extrinsic rewards as a substitute for lacking
elf-conﬁdence, and thus view them as a tool for evening out diverging patterns of human capital accumulation when they
rise. However, from psychology it is known that the positive effect of a short-term raise of extrinsic motivation by rewards
or punishments) might prove costly due to the possibility of a “crowding out” of self-conﬁdence and intrinsic motivation
n the long run.19
18 Eil and Rao (2011) provide experimental evidence for selective information processing. In their study participants took an IQ test, were given objective
eedback and then their beliefs about their ability were elicited. In response to favorable feedback, participants took into account the signal precision of the
eedback and processed information quite closely to the Bayesian benchmark, with a small optimistic bias. In contrast, processing of unfavorable feedback
as  noisy and did not take into account the signal precision, which meant that unfavorable information was discounted on average.
19 There are many experiments in psychology which conﬁrm this. Deci (1971) was the ﬁrst of them. Deci et al. (1999), for example, provide a meta-analysis
f  existing experiments conﬁrming that external rewards crowd out intrinsic motivation, while Cameron et al. (2001) reach the opposite conclusion.
ameron and Pierce (2002) suggest that the pessimistic views on external rewards come from a historical context where all external inﬂuences were seen
s  harmful. They critically assess the evidence and conclude that positive reinforcement and rewards can be used to obtain desired behavior and to maintain
nterest, and that they are possibly very effective in contemporary Western cultures if designed wisely. The focus in the economics literature is different
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Benabou and Tirole (2003) examine such motivational crowding out in a theoretical principal-agent model. We discuss
here one of their interpretations, where the agent is a child and the principal a teacher or the parents. The child has imperfect
knowledge about his ability. Self-conﬁdence refers to the belief that the child has about the probability of succeeding in a
task where effort and ability are complements. The principal, say the parents or a teacher, has knowledge about the ability
of the child to succeed in the task and wants the child to pursue the task. But the child will pursue the task and resist
distractions, say read a book or study for an exam rather than watch TV, only if it has high enough self-conﬁdence that it will
succeed in the task. Of course, in the short run the parents can motivate the child to do so by giving a reward for success. The
reward inﬂuences the motivation of the child through two channels: First, the reward increases the direct payoff that the
child has from succeeding in the task. Second, the reward affects the self-conﬁdence of the child via an inference process,
where the child takes the reward as a signal of the parents’ knowledge of her ability. Here a large reward is bad news for
the child, because it understands that the parents would offer a lower reward if the child were more able. That is, a higher
reward reduces the self-conﬁdence of the child and thereby its intrinsic motivation, which in turn lowers the effort once
the reward is no longer given. In other words, short-term motivation through extrinsic rewards may  crowd out long-term
intrinsic motivation.
4. The inﬂuence of the environment on soft skills and investments into education
In the previous section, we discussed some of the insights that behavioral economics can offer on the nature of soft
skills and the channels through which these skills inﬂuence investment decisions that individuals make about their own
education. We  now turn to the other investment components highlighted in the education investment function – namely
those of the child’s family, schools and peers – and examine how they inﬂuence soft skills.
4.1. Family inputs
A conclusion from recent research on family inputs is that the intergenerational correlation is strong and that it is likely
related to the broader quality of family environment rather than just education and income. As Dohmen et al. (2012) put
it: “Children may  end up with similar outcomes to their parents partly because they inherit similar attitudes and thus
make similar choices in life.” In line with this, they observe a correlation between the risk and trust attitudes of children
and their parents. In the same vein, Kosse and Pfeiffer (2012, 2013) report that impatience and self-control of children
and their mothers are correlated. Bauer et al. (2014) ﬁnd that children of parents with low education are less altruistic,
more selﬁsh, and more likely to be spiteful than those from high socio-economic status backgrounds, while Almås et al.
(2014) ﬁnd that children from low-income or low-education families are more reluctant to engage in competition than their
counterparts from high socio-economic status families, even after controlling for conﬁdence, risk- and time preferences,
social preferences, and psychological traits. In contrast, Anger (2011) observes that personality traits (measured by the Big
5) and locus of control are to a lesser extent transmitted from parents to children than IQ, and they ﬁnd no evidence that
the socio-economic background plays a role in the transmission process of personality traits.
Which channels affect the transmission of soft skills and preferences from parents to children? Is it the parental environ-
ment or the genes that shape the preferences of children? Evidence for transmission through parental environment comes
from Zumbuehl et al. (2013). They show that the risk and trust attitudes of kids and their parents are more similar for those
parents who invested most in the upbringing of their children. Benjamin et al. (2012) review articles in genoeconomics
which estimate the relative importance of genetic and environmental factors for preferences and conclude that genetic
factors explain a non-negligible share of individual variation.
Taken together, the emerging evidence from behavioral economics on the intergenerational transmission of soft skills
and preferences suggests that the family environment plays a big role in shaping the preferences and soft skills of children
which, in turn, inﬂuence educational investments. The transmission of skills is strongly linked to the parents’ education and
socio-economic background as well as their investments in the children.
4.2. School inputs
A conclusion from the recent research on the role of school inputs in education production is that soft skills are crucial for
understanding the inﬂuence of class size and teacher quality on individual outcomes (see Section 2). Research in behavioral
economics provides a key to understanding these inﬂuences.
One of the puzzles in the literature is why better school resources are not robustly associated with better educational
outcomes. Akerlof and Kranton (2002) point out that a pupil’s motivation may  depend on the social setting that the school
creates and the extent to which the student accepts or rejects the ideals of the school. To integrate evidence from sociology
with economic analysis they propose a model where a student mainly derives motivation from his or her identity. Next to
choosing how much effort to exert in school, which determine the pecuniary beneﬁts from later returns to skills, students
(for a survey see Gneezy et al., 2011). Rather than choosing side in this controversy, researchers study the conditions under which such trade-offs occur,
see  e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) or Benabou and Tirole (2003).
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lso make a choice to what “social category” they want to belong (this may  include gender, racial or ethnic designations).
hen adopting a social category, students aim to conform as much as possible to the ideal characteristics and behavior of
his chosen social category. Schools on the other hand create an image of what the ideal characteristics and behavior of a
tudent are. For example, schools may  choose to promote a single social category. For some of the students however the
haracteristics of the promoted social category may  clash with their background. To preserve their self-image these students
eject the school’s ideal and put in low effort despite what on the surface looks like attractive returns to investing effort into
cquiring skills.
Akerlof and Kranton (2002) argue that schools can help avoid such outcomes by being more inclusive and avoiding to
ush a narrow ideal. Offering a wide range of classes and curricula may  be one way to achieve this aim. Such a strategy allows
ore students to identify with the school and become engaged. The drawback of such an inclusive approach is that the school
s not as able to promote skills. The assumption the authors make in their analysis is that any attempt to promote a particular
kill, such as proﬁciency in math or English, will make the school less inclusive by favoring a particular social group. That
s, schools face a trade-off between investing into a more inclusive school identity (which is closer to the students’ social
ackgrounds) and investing into teaching important skills (which narrows the range of students who can identify with the
chool). Akerlof and Kranton (2002) go on to theoretically derive the optimal ideal(s) the school ought to promote and the
ptimal fraction of resources that a school should devote to create a school identity as a function of how diverse the student
opulation is. One of their key results shows that higher investments by schools into teaching skills need not always lead to
igher educational achievement, because students may  not identify with the school.
Akerlof and Kranton (2002) make an important ﬁrst step by incorporating concepts from sociology into a school’s invest-
ent decisions, but still treat as a black box how school investments affect skill teaching. Incentives for teachers are one
mportant channel how school’s investment decisions inﬂuence the quality of teaching. Incentives affect both teachers’
ffort, but also the selection of teachers. We  will not attempt to summarize the large literature on the design and effects of
ncentives in the workplace, but just note that many of the incentive schemes that have been proven to be optimal in theory
re seldom found in reality (for an overview of some puzzles see Prendergast, 1999).20 To explain several of the puzzles that
merged, researchers have started to include ideas from behavioral economics into contract theory (Koszegi, 2014 provides
n overview of this literature). Many of the insights gained from these models apply also for teachers. For example, non-
tandard preferences (such as reference-dependent preferences or social preferences) can explain why  organizations pay
oluntary bonuses, offer very simple wage schemes, or why we  observe wage compression and wage stickiness. As teachers
re often intrinsically motivated, the same trade-offs as mentioned in the student context apply. In the following, we review
 number of studies that explicitly address teachers’ incentives from a behavioral perspective.
Fryer et al. (2012) examine in a ﬁeld experiment the impact of teachers’ incentives on students’ performance. They
xplicitly rely on insights from behavioral economics – namely framing and loss aversion – to design incentive schemes for
eachers. They randomize teachers into two treatments. In the “gain” treatment, teachers receive an end-of-the-year bonus
f their students’ performance improves sufﬁciently. In the “loss” treatment, teachers receive a transfer in the beginning of
he year and they have to return this payment at the end of the year if their students do not improve sufﬁciently. Fryer
t al. (2012) observe that the loss treatment leads to a signiﬁcant improvement in students’ math test scores, while the gain
reatment does not have any signiﬁcant impact on test scores.
Besley and Ghatak (2006) address the issue that the introduction of rewards not only affects the motivation of current
eachers, but also affects who selects to become a teacher. In a theoretical model, they ask how schools that are competing
ith each other can attract good teachers. Teachers are thought to be both intrinsically and extrinsically motivated, where
ntrinsic motivation depends on the match between the teacher and the school. For example, teachers may like to teach
ertain kinds of students or have preferences over the way in which students are taught. The quality of schooling experienced
y the students can be high or low, with the probability of high quality increasing with the effort that a teacher puts in. There
re two types of teachers, good or bad teachers, and two  types of schools, good or bad. Everyone prefers to be matched with
 good type. A teacher experiences a non-pecuniary payoff whenever delivered schooling turns out to be of high quality,
hich captures the teacher’s intrinsic motivation. Good teachers are more motivated at good schools than bad teachers at
ood schools, who are as motivated as good teachers at bad schools, and both are more motivated than bad teachers at bad
chools. There are not enough good teachers around so that every school can hire a good teacher. Bonus pay for high quality
chooling not only inﬂuences teachers’ incentives, but also the sorting of teachers across schools. Bad schools need to pay a
onus to attract good teachers, whereas good schools have the advantage that they match the “mission preferences” of good
eachers. Besley and Ghatak (2006) show that it is not always optimal for these schools to implement incentive pay. Thus,
ompetition for teachers leads to bonus pay for teachers in low-quality schools but not necessarily in high-quality schools.
Dohmen and Falk (2010) provide some evidence on sorting into the teacher profession. They use data from the German
ocioeconomic Panel to examine the characteristics of teachers. Teachers in Germany, like other public sector employees,
ave a secure job with a ﬁxed performance unrelated pay. In this sense, the environment studied by Dohmen and Falk
2010) is orthogonal to the competitive environment outlined by Besley and Ghatak (2006). Dohmen and Falk (2010) ﬁnd
20 Neal (2011) examines the design of incentive schemes in educational contexts.
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that those who select into the teacher job are, relative to the comparison group, more risk-averse, more trusting, less
negatively reciprocal and less conscientious, the latter of which the authors interpret as a relatively low work attitude.21
In sum, behavioral economics provides insights into how schools can affect the work norms of students and teachers and
how school characteristics and compensation schemes affect sorting of teachers and teaching quality.
4.3. Peers
In Section 2, we saw that peer inﬂuences were particularly strong when considering behavioral outcomes such as drinking,
crime, drug use, teen pregnancy and disruptive behavior. In the following, these observations are connected to the insights
from behavioral economics about the importance of peers when it comes to soft skills.
How does a peer affect a person struggling with a self-control problem according to the literature in behavioral economics?
In a model where agents have imperfect knowledge about their willpower, Battaglini et al. (2005) study how observing peers
struggling with similar self-control problems inﬂuences a person’s own  ability to cope with a self-control problem. Observing
how a peer does provides clues to the individual about how difﬁcult it will be for himself to resist a similar temptation. It is
good news if the peer manages to regulate his behavior and bad news if he gives in to temptation. Depending on the initial
level of self-conﬁdence an agent has about his willpower and conﬁdence in others, as well as how correlated willpower
is across individuals, two types of equilibria may  arise: Either a good news equilibrium in which social interactions help
individuals to overcome their self-control problems, or a bad news equilibrium in which social interactions make self-control
problems worse, or both types of equilibria may  be possible. Further, Battaglini et al. (2005) ask when interactions with peers
are actually beneﬁcial and they investigate what characteristics the optimal peer has. They ﬁnd that if all group members
have a minimum level of self-conﬁdence, peer interactions can be beneﬁcial for all types of individuals. The optimal peer
has a slightly worse self-control problem than oneself so that his successes are encouraging (“If he can do it, I can do it, too.”)
and his failures not so discouraging (“He had a tougher battle to ﬁght than me.”). However, among groups of individuals
with really poor self-conﬁdence, social interactions exacerbate self-control problems.
The literature on self-set goals shows how these can help to overcome self-control problems by setting a reference
standard that is painful not to achieve (Hsiaw, 2013; Koch and Nafziger, 2011). Extending these ideas to study the inﬂuence
of social comparisons, Hsiaw (2010) models how a peer’s expected outcome inﬂuences the goal of an individual. She shows
that comparisons to more patient peers can help to attenuate an individual’s self-control problem by motivating him to
adopt more ambitious goals.
In sum, behavioral economics suggests that interactions with peers who  have slightly better or worse self-control prob-
lems than oneself, may  improve outcomes. However, it may  also be informative as to why  peer inﬂuences are stronger for
some particular poor outcomes such as drug use or teenage pregnancy than for test scores, since social interactions aggravate
self-control problems among individuals with really poor self-conﬁdence.
5. Discussion, implications and concluding remarks
With our review of selected theoretical and experimental studies combined with empirical evidence we attempt to
illustrate how integrating behavioral economics with educational economics holds great promise for academics and practice.
We need behavioral education economics to further our understanding of the complexity of educational decision making
and to gain ground on some of the fundamental puzzles mentioned at the beginning of this article. But we also need it to
formulate educational policy and to expand our knowledge of which educational interventions might possibly work and
which not. Consider, for example, the question how one should design reward schemes for students or teachers. Do incentive
schemes work at all and are they cost effective? If rewards work, then which ones are most effective (grading, ﬁnancial,
non-ﬁnancial) and how should incentives be designed? Do explicit incentives lead to crowding out of intrinsic motivation
and do they affect how teachers and students sort into schools? We  discussed how behavioral economics can help address
some of these questions. For example, analyzing how students respond to competition and what concerns for status they
have can help to design better grading schemes (cf. Jalava et al., 2014). Understanding non-standard preferences, such as
loss aversion, time-inconsistent preferences, or social preferences can help to think about how to design effective incentive
schemes (cf. the ﬁeld experiments by Fryer et al., 2012; Levitt et al., 2012).
Another example where behavioral economics can inform policy makers is the understanding of how self-control prob-
lems affect educational outcomes and how to design programs to cope with these problems. Here it is imperative to draw on
existing experience with methods that address self-control problems. For instance, mental contrasting and implementation
intentions can help to improve student performance (cf. the intervention study by Duckworth et al., 2011). The intervention
study “KIDS-WIN” by a research team around Daniel Schunk and Ernst Fehr at the Universities of Mainz and Zurich takes
21 A recent ﬁeld experiment by Ashraf et al. (2014) offers interesting insights into how workers with intrinsic motivation select into the health care
profession. They ﬁnd that making career incentives salient leads to an increase in qualiﬁed applicants with stronger career ambitions but that this does
not  displace applicants with pro-social preferences. Though not about teachers, some of the conclusions from the study may  be portable to the education
context.
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p these ideas to investigate how successful these tools are over a longer time horizon.22 Experiments can also reveal how
nvironmental factors affect self-control. For example, Bucciol et al. (2011) conduct an experiment with children aged 6–13
n Italy to investigate the effect of temptation (working in view of one’s favorite snack) on children’s productivity (folding
apers and marking items with a pen). When pooling all age groups together Bucciol et al. (2011) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant effect
rom temptation on productivity. However, they ﬁnd that the productivity of young children is negatively affected by temp-
ation, even though the subjects did not give in to the temptation. Another example is an experiment by Houser et al. (2012),
ho ﬁnd that older children are better able to resist a temptation23 when their decision to resist is publicly observed by
heir classmates rather than privately made. However, for younger children there is no such effect.
Furthermore, issues such as framing effects (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), default effects (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004),
udges (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), or cognitive limitations (such as choice and information overload) can play a role
hen designing educational policies. For example, Bettinger et al. (2012) report the results from a ﬁeld experiment in
hich students from low-income families received a special nudge – namely personal assistance with ﬁlling out the very
omplicated “Free Application for Federal Student Aid” form. They observe that such assistance increased submissions for aid
nd then also college attendance. In contrast, providing information only had no effect. The review article by Lavecchia et al.
2014) discusses in more detail intervention studies that have been inspired by behavioral economics, including interventions
hat affect self-control, reduce inertia, change defaults, strengthen positive identities, or simplify choice options.
Finally, it is important for the designer of an intervention to know to which extent certain preferences, or cognitive and
oft skills, are transmitted from parents to the child and to which extent these traits and skills are malleable. Both genetic
actors (Benjamin et al., 2012), as well as the social environment (Bettinger and Slonim, 200624; Almås et al., 2014; Booth
nd Nolen, 2012; Eckel et al., 201225; Zumbuehl et al., 2013; Holmlund et al., 2011) appear to play important roles here.
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